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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL. Edited by

Bennett Boskey and Mason Willrich. New York: Dunellen. 1970.
Pp. xvi, 191. $7.50.
CIVIL NuCLEAR POWER

AND

INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY.

Edited by

1'\fason Willrich. New York: Praeger. 1971. Pp. xvi, 124. $10.

The conclusion of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty1 was
only a beginning. In some ways, this was apparent on its face. Article
III called for the negotiation of safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that nuclear
materials were not being diverted from peaceful nuclear activities
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.2 Article IV
I. [1970] 1 U.S.T. 48!1, T.I.A.S. No. 68!19 (effective March 5, 1970). The treaty is
appended to both books. As of November 15, 1972, there were seventy-five parties and
twenty-nine other signatories to the treaty, including several key countries that are
expected to ratify it in 197!1. For the official United States explanation of the text, see
Hearings on Non-Proliferation Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). For a history of the negotiations, see U.S. ARMs CoNTR.OL
AND DJSARM.UIENT AGENCY, No. 48, INTERNATIONAL NEG011A.TIONS ON THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1969). See generally M. WILLRICH, NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR .ARMS CONTROL (1969); Bunn, The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 WIS, L. REv. 766; Firmage, Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 68 AM. J. INTL, L 711 (1969); Willrich, The
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World
Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1447 (1968).
2. Guidelines for such negotiations were formulated in 1970 and 1971 by the Safeguards Committee of the IAEA (to which forty-seven countries sent representatives) and
were published by that Agency as INFCIRC/15!1 (1971). See Eklund, Disarmament and
International Control, 22 !MPAcrs OF SclENCE ON SoCIETY 26!1 (1972); Imai, Nuclear
Safeguards, Adelphi Papers No. 86 (1972). A substantial number of safeguards agreements have been negotiated on the basis of these guidelines,
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held out the prospect of increased international cooperation in the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article V contemplated future arrangements under which nuclear-weapon States would share any
benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Article VI
called for good faith negotiations toward cessation of the nuclear
arms race. 8 Article VII encouraged regional agreements to exclude
nuclear weaponry.4 And article VIII called for a conference of parties in 1975 to review the operation of the treaty.
Other matters whose subsequent occurrence was known to be
vital to achieving the objectives of the treaty included: adherence
to the treaty by the greatest possible number of near-nuclear powers,
which involves .satisfying such powers that their security, economic
and political interests would not be impaired by joining the treaty; 5
development of civilian nuclear power in ways consistent with the
objectives and effective verification of the treaty; 6 establishment of
effective national safeguards systems; 7 improvement in safeguards
techniques and instrumentation; and adequate support of the IAEA
and its safeguards activities.
3. The principal forums for such negotiations are the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva; the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly;
the SALT negotiations, now being conducted in Geneva; and the negotiations scheduled
to begin on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. For texts of the agreements concluded to date, see U.S. ~ s CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, 1959-1972 (1972).
4. The one such agreement concluded to date is the Additional Protocol II to the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, [1971] I U.S.T. 754,
T.I.A.S. No. 7137 (effective May 12, 1971). For a history and explanation by its principal
progenitor, see A. GARCIA ROBLES, THE DENUCLEARIZAUON OF LA.TIN AMERICA (1967). See
Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nuclear
Free Zone, 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 282 (1970), for an excellent legal analysis. See also Hear•
ings on Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
5. See UNITED NATIONS, EFFECIS OF THE PossmLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND nre
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER
DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS (1968); UNITED NATIONS AssOCIATION OF THE UNITED
STATES, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1967); STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE REsEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT (1972). See
also UNITED NATIONS AssOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM: A
Sovn:r-AMERICAN Ex.CHANGE (1972),
6. For discussion of the implications of such developments as breeder reactors and
controlled fusion, see M. WILLRICH, GLOBAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (1971). For
background on enriched-uranium technology, see Appendix 2 to THE NEAR-NUCLEAR
CouNTIUES AND THE NPT, supra note 5. Continuously fueled natural-uranium reactors
and reactors using highly enriched uranium are both alluded to in Mr. Gilinsky's portions of the books here under review.
7. The guidelines developed for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards
presuppose an effective national system of materials accountability. International safeguards do not attempt to provide for the physical security of nuclear materials, which
is the responsibility of national systems; but the IAEA recently issued some Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. At the November meeting
of the Atomic Industrial Forum in Washington, D.C., Professor Willrich made a provocative speech on the latter problem, foreshadowing a book to be published under his
editorship in 1973, entitled INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY. See also
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Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control is a good introduction for the general reader to these topics. In the opening section of
the book, Adrian Fisher and George Bunn-two of the chief architects and negotiators of the treaty-explain its objectives and rationale, and assess the prospects for effectively limiting "horizontal"
proliferation, the spread of control over nuclear weapons to additional countries. Balance is provided by George Rathjens' chapter
on controlling "vertical" proliferation, the nuclear arms race among
the nuclear-weapon States. He introduces many of the basic issues
in the SALT negotiations.8
Roughly one third of the book is devoted to safeguards. Victor
Gilinsky's chapter on the nuclear fuel cycle and the military potential of civilian nuclear power provides a lucid background on this
subject. Herbert Scoville explains the technical capabilities of safeguards, and John Palfrey comments on the extent to which safeguards can be expected to provide assurance against cheating. A
chapter by Lawrence Scheinman on the political hurdle of reaching
a mutually satisfactory safeguards agreement between Euratom and
the IAEA illuminates problems that since appear to have been successfully surmounted.9
Two chapters are devoted to the problem of peaceful nuclear
explosions. Chapter 8, by David Brooks and Henry Myers, is a muchneeded corrective to the overselling of the Plowshare program.10
For example, with respect to the stimulation of natural gas by nuclear explosives, it points out that, to produce five per cent of the
current annual United States consumption of natural gas by this
PREVENTING

NUCLEAR THEFr:

GUIDELINES FOR

INDUSTRY

AND GOVERNMENT

(R. Leachman

&: P. Althoff ed. 1972).

8. See R. McNAMARA, THE E.5SENCE OF SECURITY (1968) (the chapter on "Mutual
Deterrence" contains the seminal statement of the basic rationale for strategic arms
limitation); G. RATHJENS, THE FUTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE: OPTIONS FOR THE
1970's (1969) (for a full treatment of the topic); H. ScovII.LE, MlssILE MADNESS (1970)
(for a popularized discus.sion).
9. After prolonged negotiations, an agreement between these two international
organizations was reached and approved by the governing bodies of each in September
1972. Formal signature of the agreement by these bodies and by Germany, Italy, and
the Benelux countries is expected in the near future.
IO. The most touted application of nuclear explosives for many years was the nuclear
excavation of a new sea-level canal through the Isthmus of Panama. After intensive
study by the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, extending over
four years and costing 22 million dollars (of which 17.5 million dollars were devoted
to investigating two routes for which nuclear excavation had been proposed), the
Commis.sion recommended conventional excavation of another route. The original cost
estimate for the most promising route for nuclear excavation was 750 million dollars.
Based on its study, the Commission raised this estimate to 3 billion dollars, which was
higher than its estimate for the conventionally excavated route. The report added,
"Nuclear excavation is not yet a proven construction technique and there is no assurance that construction plans and cost estimates based on present knowledge are
valid." REPORT OF THE An.ANTIC-PACIFIC lNTEROCEANIC CANAL STUDY COMMISSION 174
(1970).
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means would require approximately 1,000 nuclear explosions-more
than the total number of announced nuclear weapons tests conducted in the world to date. Again, for the creation of underground
cavities to store natural gas, it suggests that another 1,000 nuclear
explosions would be needed to meet twenty-five per cent of the estimated new storage capacity requirements. The second chapter on
Plowshare-by Bernard Bechhoefer--discusses possible international
arrangements to help implement article V of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
The final section of the book addresses the troublesome problem
of security assurances, including security guarantees, alliances, troop
deployments, and dissemination of nuclear weapons (while retaining custody and control)-all of which look toward increased commitments by the United States at a time when this seems hardly in
the cards. But the chapter by Joseph Coffey points out that shifts in
perceptions of the threat and changes in emphasis in our military
doctrine and programs could also help with this problem. In the
final chapter, Richard Falk considers the potential of undertakings
to preclude the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons.11
All in all, this is a good, well-rounded, short work on the manyfaceted non-proliferation problem. It is much meatier than Civil
Nuclear Power and International Security, which is based on a threeday symposium held at the University of Virginia in May 1970. The
three papers discussed there included one by Victor Gilinsky-basically the same as his paper in the earlier book-on the military potential of civil nuclear power; one by Douglas George and Ralph
Lumb on international safeguards, which adds some fresh insights
to the coverage of this subject in the earlier book;12 and a somewhat
pessimistic view by Leonard Beaton of the prospects for non-proliferation in light of the ever-increasing availability of weapons-grade
nuclear material coupled with what he sees as the economic and
political realities.
Thus, the subject matter of this latter publication overlaps, but
is far less extensive than, that in the first book. What it does add is
an edited paraphrase of the discussion of these papers by distinguished individual panelists from the IAEA, Euratom, the United
11. See also Ullman, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 669
(1972). The only existing treaty containing an explicit undertaking not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against certain other countries is Additional Protocol
II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, to which
the United States and the United Kingdom are parties. See note 4 supra. In November
1972, the Chinese People's Republic issued and circulated to the U.N. General Assembly a declaration paralleling the undertakings in this Protocol.
12. It should be noted, however, that the safeguards documents set forth in the
appendix have in large measure been supplanted by the guidelines referred to in note 2
supra. This also reduces the utility of ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL
VERIFICATION (1971) by Allan McKnight, former Inspector General of the IAEA.
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Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., Germany, Japan, Canada, Sweden, India, and
the United States. This record of their discussion may give the
reader some feel for the various viewpoints represented, but it could
not do so in anywhere near the depth of the remarkable negotiations
held in Vienna in 1970-1971, which resulted in a broad international
consensus on detailed guidelines for the safeguards agreements called
for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.13 While the latter was only
open to official representatives (including some of the panelists), it
was where the action was, and the Virginia symposium had no discernible impact on that action. Although the panelists' comments
in this book do suggest a few lines of inquiry worth further pursuit,
the first book is far more useful for most readers.14

Charles N. Van Doren,
Deputy General Counsel,
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
l!I. See note 2 supra.
14. For an interesting analysis of the full range of post-war arms control agreements,
see E. STEIN, !MPACI' OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ON INTERNATIONAL I.Aw: SELECTED
AsPECTS, 1971-ll ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, R.ECUEIL DES CoURS 223 (1971).
Among foreign books relating to non-proliferation, G. DELCOIGNE &: G. RUBINSTEIN, NONPROLIFERATION DES ARMES NuCLEAIRES ET SYSTEMES DE CONTRC>LE (1970), presents some
new perspectives on the subject. See also G. FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NuCLEAR WEAPONS (1972); w. WENTZ, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION (1968) (argument for selective proliferation, since outlawed by the treaty).
It should be noted that Professor Willrich was formerly a colleague of the reviewer
in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as were the following other authors
cited herein: Adrian Fisher, George Bunn, Herbert Scoville, George Rathjens, Henry
Myers, and Davis Robinson.

